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Reasonable Grounds Evidence
Involving Sexual Violence
in Darfur
John Hagan, Richard Brooks, and Todd Haugh
Internal and international conflicts can often involve a level of impunity
that allows sexual violence to persist unchecked by military and political leaders.
The recent reversal by an appeals panel at the International Criminal Court of
a pretrial decision not to charge President al-Bashir of Sudan with genocide in
Darfur offers an important foundation for introducing new types of evidence
that can increase the investigation and prosecution of sexual violence during
conflicts. The reversal cited the incorrect use of the “beyond a reasonable
doubt” standard when the lesser standard of “reasonable grounds” applied.
Social science provides methods and measures that can be uniquely used to
develop reasonable grounds evidence, for example, to demonstrate the roles of
physical perpetrators acting together in horizontal relationships, as well as to
establish the indirect participation through vertical relationships of higher-level
defendants, in a chain of command of superior responsibility.We illustrate these
points by presenting social science evidence of the responsibility of President
al-Bashir and middle- and lower-level figures in genocidal violence in Darfur.lsi_1208 881..918
INTRODUCTION: THE CALL FOR A NEW TYPE
OF EVIDENCE
In remarks to The Hague Colloquium on Sexual Violence as Interna-
tional Crime, Luis Moreno-Ocampo (2009; also in this symposium), prosecu-
tor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), observed that cases of gender
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and sexual violence committed during conflict are “particularly problematic”
because “these crimes are often underreported.” UN High Commissioner on
Human Rights Navanethem Pillay (2009a, also in this symposium) similarly
observed in her remarks to the colloquium that “we [the international com-
munity] are only addressing the tip of the iceberg . . . merely scratching the
surface” in prosecuting sexual violence perpetrated during conflict. Both
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo and High Commissioner Pillay spoke to what
those victimized during conflict know directly: below the surface of internal
and international conflict is a massive level of impunity that allows sexual
violence to persist unchecked by military and political leaders. As seen in
conflicts such as Darfur, the sexual violence has also often been left unchecked
by international law.
High Commissioner Pillay (2009b) nonetheless highlighted the work
of international tribunals in the 1990s and insisted that the prosecution of
sexual violence committed during conflict was “a triumph for women who
had previously been considered ‘collateral damage’” (460; see also Center on
Law and Globalization 2009b). Prosecuting sexual violence “has to be done,”
she said, “even in situations where women cannot identify perpetrators”
(ibid.). High Commissioner Pillay insisted that “a good prosecutor should be
able to argue a case without individual testimony by establishing the plan-
ning, the modus, and the effects of the crime” (466). Prosecutor Moreno-
Ocampo (n.d.) made a similar declaration. “Our goal is to go . . . further: a
case with no witnesses, no victims.” He expressed a desire for a new kind of
evidence to be made available to those prosecuting the most serious of
international crimes: “We want to use methods [that social scientists] are
developing, such as statistical analysis. We must refine how to use your tools.”
Xabier Agirre, senior analyst from the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor,
echoed Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo’s call for a new type of evidence. Agirre
spoke to the colloquium more specifically regarding what role social scientists
can play in developing this evidence (Center on Law and Globalization
2009a). He identified three social scientific needs: “[1] to get a level of
description of the patterns of the crime; [2] then, to correlate the crime with
command structures that produced it; [3] then to explain what caused it.”
Agirre also gave social scientists a specific directive: “We need descriptive
statistics to show that the crime is grave, that its scope warrants the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, which intends to take on only the most serious cases.”
The remarks of these three speakers preceded a commentary by law
professor Harmen van der Wilt (2009). Professor van der Wilt spoke regard-
ing the ICC’s decision to issue an arrest warrant for Sudan’s President Omar
al-Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity, including rape, as well
as Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo’s denied application on the charge of geno-
cide (see Situation in Darfur 2008, 1). Van der Wilt’s (2009) central point
was that in prosecuting high-level officials, international criminal law has
oscillated between ideas about “joint criminal enterprise” and the concepts
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of “co-perpetration” and “participation” (308). He concluded that a “huge
challenge of judges and prosecutors alike is to portray men like Al Bashir
as ‘spiders in the web,’ demonstrating how they interact and communicate
with others in order to accomplish their devious goals” (308).
The common message of the four speakers—the necessity of developing
new types of evidence to aid in the investigation and prosecution of inter-
national crimes—was highly relevant to the evidentiary issues addressed
in recent actions of the ICC Appeals Chamber. On February 3, 2010, the
Appeals Chamber reversed the Pretrial Chamber’s decision not to issue an
arrest warrant for President al-Bashir on the crime of genocide (see Prosecutor
v. Al Bashir 2010). The Appeals Chamber reasoned that the Pretrial Chamber
had applied an erroneously high “beyond-a-reasonable-doubt” standard of
proof when it decided whether an arrest warrant would be issued for President
al-Bashir (see paras. 30-33).1 According to the Appeals Chamber, consistent
with the Rome Statute,2 the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard only applies
at the trial stage of a prosecution, not at the investigation and arrest stage (see
paras. 30-33). The Appeals Chamber ruled that the standard of proof at the
pretrial stage is the lesser standard of whether there were “reasonable grounds
to believe” that President al-Bashir committed genocide (paras. 30, 42).
Because the Pretrial Chamber misapplied the legal standard in addressing the
genocide charge, the Appeals Chamber remanded the issue for a “new deci-
sion, using the correct standard of proof” (para. 42). At the time, Prosecutor
Moreno-Ocampo vowed to introduce new evidence of President al-Bashir’s
genocidal intent sufficient to meet the standard of “reasonable grounds.”3
1. The Pretrial Chamber concluded that an arrest warrant could only be issued if the
existence of genocidal intent was the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence
(see Prosecutor v. Al Bashir 2009a).
2. The applicable section of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998)
provides as follows:
At any time after the initiation of an investigation, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall, on the
application of the Prosecutor, issue a warrant of arrest of a person if, having examined
the application and the evidence or other information submitted by the Prosecutor, it is
satisfied that:
(a) There are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court; and
(b) The arrest of the person appears necessary:
(i) To ensure the person’s appearance at trial,
(ii) To ensure that the person does not obstruct or endanger the investigation or
the court proceedings, or
(iii) Where applicable, to prevent the person from continuing with the commis-
sion of that crime or a related crime which is within the jurisdiction of the
Court and which arises out of the same circumstances.
3. Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo told Reuters that he would present new evidence to the
ICC to support his application to have al-Bashir charged with genocide. Specifically, Moreno-
Ocampo noted al-Bashir’s expulsion of humanitarian assistance from Darfur: “When he
expelled these people who were providing the water and the food he confirmed his intention to
destroy his people” (quoted in Reuters 2010).
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On July 12, 2010, the Pretrial Chamber, now following the correct
legal standard, issued a ruling finding that there were reasonable grounds to
believe al-Bashir committed genocide. The subsequent arrest warrant cited
al-Bashir’s “specific intent to destroy in part the Fur, Masalit [sic] and
Zaghawa ethnic groups.”4
I. THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE
In their comments at the colloquium, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo
and High Commissioner Pillay set a bold and far-sighted agenda. They have
embraced the innovative use of social science evidence to supplement tradi-
tional legal approaches in gathering evidence and prosecuting crimes of sexual
violence committed during international and internal conflicts—crimes that
are often precursors to and are themselves acts of genocide. The tools of social
science are uniquely able to develop the type of reasonable grounds evidence
necessary to support such charges. Social science evidence, unlike traditional
modes of evidence, can demonstrate the roles of the perpetrators of genocide
acting together in horizontal relationships as well as establish the indirect
participation of perpetrators through vertical relationships, linking higher-
level defendants in a chain of command of superior responsibility.
It is just this type of evidence that is now being called for by the ICC.
High Commissioner Pillay (2009b) noted that joint criminal enterprise, a key
concept in the prosecution of joint participation in sexual violence,
refers to any individual who plans, instigates, commits, orders or abets
the execution of crimes. It does not require the direct hand or the
physical participation of the accused in the perpetration of the criminal
act. Rather, it applies when this individual participates in criminal
conduct with a plurality of actors. (463)
High Commissioner Pillay (2009a; also in this symposium) emphasized that
“the responsibility lies not just with the military leaders, but with their
political masters as well.” Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo charged that in Darfur,
Victims from Darfur recently joined Prosecutor Moreno-Campo’s appeal, which success-
fully reversed the decision by the Pretrial Chamber. The victims supported the argument that
a lower standard of proof applied at the pretrial investigation stage. They argued, and the
Appeals Chamber agreed, that the Pretrial Chamber erred in applying “an overly critical
evaluation of the evidence” (See Situation in Darfur (2010, para. 32); see also Prosecutor v. Al
Bashir (2010, para. 39)).
4. The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (“Omar AlBashir”), Case No. ICC-02/
05-01/09, Second Warrant for Arrest of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 8–9 ( July 12, 2010),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc907140.pdf.
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this chain of command ran through Sudan’s governing hierarchy, including
President al-Bashir and Deputy Minister of the Interior Ahmad Harun (see
Situation in Darfur 2008, 8).5
Evidence of joint participation in crimes of sexual violence, especially
that rising to the level of genocide, is difficult to develop, however. As van der
Wilt (2009) commented, “the choice of a proper concept of criminal respon-
sibility sustaining the charge against high-level perpetrators like President
Al Bashir is not obvious, especially not at the early stages of investigation”
(307). Yet joint enterprise evidence must be developed if case investigation
and preparation for the prosecution of crimes of genocide are to proceed.6
In this article, we present this evidence—evidence sufficient to meet
the reasonable grounds standard required by the Rome Statute and recently
enunciated by the Appeals Chamber—as to President al-Bashir’s joint par-
ticipation in the crime of genocide. The evidence is developed from the US
Department of State (2004) Atrocities Documentation Survey (ADS).7 The
specific evidence we present is based on the uniquely detailed ADS data set,
which includes reports of sexual victimization as well as other forms of
violence. The method of analysis we apply to the ADS data—hierarchical
linear modeling (HLM)—allows us to document the targeting of groups of
persons identified in the ethnic and racial terms protected under the Geno-
cide Convention (see part III). HLM analysis additionally allows us to focus
on group or village clusters, as well as on the individual level, to document
occurrences of violence that are aimed at the destruction of ethnic groups in
5. Legal scholars call these hierarchical forms of participation “indirect co-perpetration,”
“perpetration-by-means,” “perpetration by another person,” and “control over an organization”
(see van der Wilt 2009, 308). All ultimately involve the superior responsibility invoked by
Hugo Grotius (1964) when he wrote centuries ago that “we must accept the principle that he
who knows of a crime, and is able and bound to prevent it but fails to do so, himself commits
a crime” (523).
6. David Scheffer (2002, 237-48; 2006, 398), the first US ambassador on war crimes,
recommended distinguishing between “mass atrocity law” and “mass atrocity crime” as a way to
address this difficulty. At early stages in cases, Scheffer prioritized establishing patterns of
atrocity crime over resolving issues of atrocity law (see Scheffer 2002, 399-400; 2006, 237-44).
According to Article II of the Genocide Convention, genocide consists of any of the
following five acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious
group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948).
7. The information gathered as part of the ADS, which was collected for then–Secretary
of State Colin Powell from 1,136 refugees across Sudan’s Darfur border in Chad, became
the foundation for Powell’s charge before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that
genocide occurred in Darfur (see Powell 2004).
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whole or in part (see part III). Our analysis further examines the joining of
government of Sudan (GoS) troops with local Arab militias in attacks on
black African villagers, indicating the responsibility of government leaders,
including President al-Bashir, in a joint enterprise chain of command (see
part III). Our ultimate conclusion is that, through the documentation and
analysis of the ADS data, reasonable grounds evidence sufficient to charge,
arrest, and aid in convicting President Al Bashir for the crime of genocide in
Darfur does exist.
II. DEVASTATION, IMPUNITY, DENIAL, AND OBSTACLES
TO RESEARCH INVOLVING SEXUAL VIOLENCE
COMMITTED DURING CONFLICT
Before elaborating on our analysis, we will first discuss why the evidence
gleaned from the ADS is so important, why such evidence is so rarely devel-
oped and so scarce, how the scarcity of this evidence allows for the denial of
sexual violence committed during conflict to continue, and how obstacles to
research on mass atrocities can be overcome.
Devastation
Public health scholars have studied the devastating physical, mental,
and social consequences of the epidemic occurrence of rape and sexual
violence in conflict zones (Levy and Sidel 1997; Reed and Keely 2001).
Health scholars conceptualize this violence within their study of “complex
humanitarian emergencies” (see Waldman and Martone 1999, discussing
“complex emergences” in the context of humanitarian efforts). The most
obvious near-term health consequences to victims of sexual violence include
physical injury, reproductive trauma and harm, the spread of sexually trans-
mitted diseases (including HIV), and unwanted pregnancies (Acquire
Technical Update 2006). Long-lasting health consequences include trau-
matic fistula, a medical syndrome resulting from sexual violence that causes
continuing urinary incontinence, leaving victims traumatized, shamed, and
socially ostracized (Acquire Technical Update 2006). The victims’ feelings
of helplessness and humiliation persist in the form of posttraumatic stress
disorders long after the conflict has ended (Acquire Technical Update 2006).
Impunity
Despite the devastation caused by sexual violence, history records
centuries of impunity for such acts committed during conflict. Historians
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estimate that Russian soldiers raped nearly two million women in eastern
Germany during World War II (Mandl 2001). Japanese occupiers raped,
assaulted, or killed approximately 20,000 women in Nanjing during the first
months of 1937. Japan also kept approximately 200,000 Korean and other
women in sexual slavery from about 1931 to 1945 (Pritchard and Zaide 1981;
Gardam and Jarvis 2001). Yet the charters for the international military
tribunals for Germany and Japan that followed World War II did not
explicitly include rape in their charges of crimes against humanity (Askin
1997, 163).
FollowingWorld War II, international criminal law’s failure to recognize
sexual violence as a crime left victims without redress or remedy. States
continued to treat rape as “collateral damage” and the “spoils of war” (Prim-
oratz 2007, 219). Véronique Zanetti (2007) writes that, “Not only was it not
condemned with the same severity as other equivalent violations of rights,
but it was long considered as a ‘side effect’ of war or even, more cynically, as
a bonus to soldiers, regardless of allegiance” (44). Denial, neglect, allowance,
instigation, organization, and cover-up all played their roles. Social science
failed victims of sexual violence too: it provided neither sufficient data
collection nor an adequate theoretical conceptualization to expose state
responsibility for sexual victimization during international and internal
conflicts. This is finally changing along with the laws of war.
In 1993 and 1994, the international criminal tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) explicitly included rape and sexual
violence in their charters (see Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia 1993; Statute of the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Rwanda 1994). After years of indifference, international criminal
law began to recognize the social consequences of rape and sexual violence
associated with conflicts. For example, intergroup sexual violence can be a
means of controlling reproduction—a powerful physiological and sociological
weapon used to destroy social groups. Rape can also be a means of absorbing
and eliminating enemy populations.
The ICTR verdict in the Akayesu case in Rwanda, adjudicated by then-
ICTR Justice Pillay, identified rape as “an integral part of the process of
destruction” (Prosecutor v. Akayesu 1998, para. 731). The ICTY verdict in
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic (2001, paras. 436, 542) also recog-
nized rape as an element of crimes against humanity and established sexual
enslavement as a war crime. Akayesu defined rape as a “physical invasion of a
sexual nature, committed in circumstances which are coercive” (para. 688).
The ICTY Furundzija case more restrictively defined rape in terms of human
vaginal and anal penetration or penetration with objects, thereby facilitating
the inclusion within the prosecution of rape acts perpetrated against both
male and female victims (Prosecutor v. Furundzija 1998, para. 185).
Despite the ICTY and ICTR cases, states and international institu-
tions still lagged in recognizing the role of state participation in and state
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responsibility for protection from rape and sexual violence in conflict situa-
tions. The United States officially repudiated state-led sexual violence when
it presented a resolution in October 2007 at the United Nations condemning
government use of organized rape and sexual violence to achieve political
or military objectives (Warren 2007). The response of other nation-states
resulted in the temporary removal of references to government responsibility
in the resolution (Agence France-Presse 2008). However, in June 2008, the
UN Security Council finally adopted a follow-up resolution sponsored by the
United States that implied the role of states. The resolution stated that “rape
and other forms of sexual violence can constitute a war crime, a crime against
humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide.”8 The organizing
role of governments in sexual violence during war making became more
difficult to ignore.
Denial
Nonetheless, high officials such as Sudan’s President al-Bashir still
unequivocally deny the occurrence of rape and sexual violence during both
war and peacetime. President al-Bashir insisted in an internationally reported
interview that rape never occurs in Darfur. According to al-Bashir, “It is not
in the Sudanese culture or people of Darfur to rape. It doesn’t exist. We do not
have it” (Curry 2007). President al-Bashir’s statements were strikingly similar
to that of another head of state charged with war crimes: Saddam Hussein.
When confronted with testimony about rape at his trial for the Anfal geno-
cide in Iraq, SaddamHussein told the Iraq High Tribunal (IHT) that he could
not “sit down and remain silent when it’s said that an Iraqi woman was
raped. . . . This couldn’t happen while Saddam Hussein is alive” (quoted in
Wong 2006). In a significant sense, the IHT vindicated Hussein’s claims,
because in spite of the evidence of rape and sexual violence heard in theAnfal
trial, the IHT did not explicitly charge Saddam and his codefendants with
rape (Global Justice Center 2007). Instead, the IHT’s general charges of the
crime of torture subsumed the charges of rape (9–10). The failure of the IHT
to explicitly charge rape against Hussein is significant because Iraq is a
country where national courts still legally and socially marginalize rape
victims, likening them to offenders for “dishonoring” their families and even
the perpetrators of the crime (2).
This kind of legal neglect—if not outright denial—of rape continues in
many traditional legal systems. Researchers have not yet challenged these
8. S.C. Res. 1820 (2008, para. 3) (S.C. Res. 1820, UNDoc. S/RES/1820 ( June 19, 2008));
see also S.C. Res. 1888 (2009), reaffirming S.C. Res 1820 and noting the need for greater state
involvement in implementing the resolution (S.C. Res. 1888, UNDoc S/RES/1888 (September
30, 2009)).
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denials with enough quantitative studies of rape and sexual violence in
conflict zones. As noted by Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo and High Com-
missioner Pillay, it is difficult to systematically record and analyze sexual
violence, especially in conflict zones and repressive regimes. Although even
a small amount of sexual violence creates widespread havoc that disrupts
and displaces households and communities, the societal taboos and shaming
that often surround rape and sexual violence also effectively suppress its
reporting.
Obstacles to Research
Ideally, in order to break through these public and legal denials, social
scientists would use a population-based random sampling of communities that
incorporates self-reports of the respondents’ own sexual victimization to
provide the foundation for the study of sexual violence in conflict settings.
However, the large-scale displacement of population groups by attackers in
conflict situations makes ordinary household probability sampling misleading.
Instead, much more targeted samples are required. For example, systematic
quantitative analysis of mortality has been conducted using survey data col-
lected in special high-risk settings, such as displacement and refugee camps
(Hagan and Palloni 2006, 1578–79; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008,
889). These analyses demonstrate that in the rare instances where specific
survey questions reveal rape, the prevalence of reports among women is as
high as 7 percent (Amowitz et al. 2002, 520). An important aspect of rape is
its capacity to terrorize a population.9
Societal taboos and stigma in Arab and Muslim culture further restrict
reporting of sexual victimization. In postinvasion Iraq, Lynn Amowitz led
a systematic household survey in three highly affected southern cities
(Amowitz et al. 2004). Only four of 1,057 survey respondents reported a
preinvasion regime-related rape or sexual assault involving an extended family
member since 1991 (1475). Displacement of many of the victims and norma-
tive concerns about family honor likely suppressed truthful responses (1476).
When Amowitz and her colleagues reframed the question to include rape or
sexual assault involving community members, beyond and without attribution
of family membership, eighty-seven respondents reported rapes (1474). These
findings encourage a new focus on the larger community, while earlier work in
displacement and refugee camps encourages sampling in concentrated popu-
lations of human rights victims. Despite the potential obstacles and regardless
of the tools ultimately used, it is clear that social science has a particular role in
identifying sexual violence committed during conflict.
9. See the discussion of rape as an instrument of terror in Hagan 2003 (199–200).
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III. A NEW APPROACH
Research conducted by John Hagan, Alberto Palloni, and Wenona
Rymond-Richmond—published in Science, the American Journal of Public
Health, the American Sociological Review, and Darfur and the Crime of
Genocide—sought to build on these lessons of the past (Hagan and Palloni
2006; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008, 2009; Hagan, Rymond-
Richmond, and Palloni 2009). Here, the authors bring together the core
findings of this research to set a social science foundation for the development
of reasonable grounds evidence of rape and sexual violence as support for
charges of crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur.
As noted, previous survey research encourages moving beyond the
reported rape of respondents themselves to reports of rape in the larger
communities from which they come. The predictable legal objection to
evidence regarding the reported rape of others is its hearsay aspect. The similar
concern from the social science perspective is the reliability and validity of
these secondhand reports. However, international criminal law allows hearsay
evidence and provides special accommodations to ensure the anonymity and
confidentiality of witnesses.10 Social science in this case involved the use of an
HLMmethodology, which allows for the cross-validation of aggregated respon-
dent reports (for example, in villages or settlements) while also taking into
account individual-level sources of variation and bias (Raudenbush and Bryk
2002). In the following pages, we summarize our use of this method to analyze
central tendencies in the aggregation and concentration of the ADS reports of
sexual attacks at the community or settlement level in Darfur.11
Building the Darfur Case
We conceive the mass atrocities in Darfur as follows: the leadership of
the government of Sudan knowingly allowed a racially targeted outbreak of
10. Hearsay evidence is generally admissible in ICC cases, but judges may exclude hearsay
evidence if they believe it is unreliable. The reliability of hearsay evidence is evaluated on an
item-by-item basis. In addition, victims of sexual violence receive heightened protection under
ICC procedural rules (see International Criminal Court 2002).
11. The previous survey work on violence in displacement and refugee camps also encour-
ages data collection in concentrated human rights victim populations, where rape and sexual
violence are likely to be more common. The World Health Organization conducted previous
work with the Sudanese Ministry of Health in internal displacement camps in Darfur and
focused on mortality resulting from disease and malnutrition. The foundation for this work was
focused on mortality in “complex humanitarian emergencies.” The researchers did not consider
violence resulting from attacks on settlements in Darfur. In order to focus on the mass atrocities,
including sexual violence, involved in these attacks, it was necessary to conduct the research
with refugees outside Darfur. This is one reason why the US State Department, in cooperation
with the Coalition for International Justice, collected the ADS data across the border from
Darfur in Chad.
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violence to emerge and escalate between the Arab and black African groups
in Darfur, which resulted in rapes and sexual violence during the murder,
destruction, and displacement of those black African groups. Although
documentary evidence thus far is limited, in this article we link this scarce
evidence to the social science evidence indicating that there was superior
responsibility—and therefore participation—from the highest levels of the
Sudanese government. The data show coordinated and racially targeted
attacks on black African farms and villages by the GoS military forces acting
in cooperation with Arab Janjaweed militias. As one refugee responding to
the survey reported, “They come together, they fight together, and they leave
together” (US Department of State 2004).
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo identified three individuals—President
al-Bashir, former Deputy Minister of the Interior Ahmad Harun, and the
militia leader Ali Kushayb—as joint participants in the mass atrocities in
Darfur (Julie Flint, quoted in Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2009, 116.).
In addition to these individuals, Figure 1 names three other militia leaders
identified in the ADS data who participated in mass atrocities in connection
with Deputy Minister Harun. This chain of command is evidenced by the
documentation and analysis of the US State Department survey of refugees in
President 
Omer al-Bashir 
Vice President 
Ali Osman Taha 
Minister of Interior 
Abduraheem Mohammed Hussein 
Director of Security and Military Intelligence 
Salah Abdallah Gosh 
Deputy Minister of Interior 
“Darfur Security Desk” 
Ahmad Harun 
GoS Armed Forces 
Gaddal 
Police 
State Security Committees 
Local Security Committees 
Janjaweed/Militia Leaders 
Musa Hilal Hamid Dawai Abdullah Shineibat Ali Kushayb 
Kabkabiya-Kutum-
Karnoi 
Terbeba-Arara-Beida Habila–Foro Burunga 
Settlement and Sublocalities 
Mukjar-Bindisi-
Garsila-Deleig 
Identified in ICC Prosecutor’s Application 
FIGURE 1.
Sudan-Darfur Chain of Command, 2003–2004
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Chad (the ADS), which we discuss later in this article. “This brings us,” High
Commissioner Pillay (2009a; also in this symposium) observed,
to the concept of the duty of enquiry that lies with anyone in a superior
position, military or civilian, who knew or had reason to know that
crimes were being perpetrated or about to be committed, and failed to
take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent them and to punish
those responsible.
This also raises the question, what level of evidence is required to advance an
investigation and proceed to a lawful arrest pursuant to that duty of inquiry?
We do not assert that the evidence presented in this article necessarily
rises to the level of “substantial grounds to believe” that President al-Bashir
committed the crime of genocide or that the evidence reaches the even
higher standard of “beyond reasonable doubt” required for a conviction. As
the Appeals Chamber recently held, these higher thresholds constitute “an
erroneous standard of proof” at the pretrial investigation and arrest stage
(Prosecutor v. Al Bashir 2010). Instead, we focus on the reasonable grounds
standard, as explained by the Appeals Chamber. This standard does not
require that there be “absolute certainty that the evidence exclude all
hypotheses inconsistent with the requisite statutory elements of the alleged
crime”—if it did, the “lower threshold of ‘reasonable grounds’ would be
meaningless” (para. 12). As such, the kinds of testable hypotheses and social
science evidence presented in this article are aimed at furthering reasonable
grounds evidence that will support the determination that President al-Bashir
committed the crime of genocide.12
The ADS Sample and Interviews
In June 2004, the Sudan government was on notice that the United
States was observing and recording its coordinated attacks on villages in
Darfur with satellite and aerial imagery (Amarelo 2004). Although these
attacks were, at a minimum, signs of ethnic cleansing (if not outright geno-
cide), US officials cautioned “that the images are not hard evidence until they
are corroborated by testimony of witnesses on the ground” (Amarelo 2004).
Therefore, during the following July and August, the US State Department,
at the direction of then-Secretary of State Colin Powell, fielded the Atroci-
ties Documentation Survey. The ADS was a survey of 1,136 refugees who
witnessed and experienced attacks in Darfur but were now living in Chad.
12. The Appeals Chamber made clear that under the Rome Statute such evidence is a
prerequisite for al-Bashir’s lawful arrest or detention. Indeed, at the earlier investigation stage,
the Appeals Chamber cites the prosecutor in its decision as making the crucial point that
requiring the higher trial standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt might actually endanger
witnesses (see Prosecutor v. Al Bashir 2010, paras. 10, 18).
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An eight-page summary of the ADS, which included a table of
descriptive statistics and maps, formed the background for Secretary of
State Powell’s testimony on September 9, 2004, to the US Senate Foreign
Relations Committee stating that genocide was occurring in Darfur (US
Department of State 2004). This summary report, however, was only the
first step. We report next how we have used the ADS to document and
analyze rape and sexual violence in Darfur. The point is to illustrate how
a social scientific analysis of these mass atrocities involving rape and sexual
violence can establish a foundation for reasonable grounds evidence of
genocide.
The US State Department contracted with the Coalition for Interna-
tional Justice to conduct the ADS from July 12 through August 18, 2004. The
ADS used a randomized multistage probability sample of 1,136 Darfuri refu-
gees in twenty sites in Chad. The United Nations used lettered grids to divide
refugee camps into sectors, each led by a recognized chief, umda, sheikh,
or other leadership figure.13 The ADS team identified all sectors of all camps
and proportionately sampled them by size and ethnicity. The team similarly
sampled informal villages by using landmarks as sector boundaries. Inter-
viewers set out on random routes from the leaders’ households and selected
every tenth occupied space in each sector. Using a Kish grid,14 a team member
randomly selected an adult to interview in each fully enumerated household
(US Department of State 2004).
The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research developed
the questionnaire used by the ADS team with input on the victim and
perpetrator crime codes from international law advisors (US Department of
State 2004). Using cartographers and translators, interviewers located 90
percent of the villages from which refugees had fled. We thus located 932
respondents clustered in twenty-two originating village clusters (referred to
here as villages) with fifteen or more respondents each. Population pyramids
from this refugee sample and samples from displacement camps inside Darfur
are similar with regard to age and gender composition (US Department of
State 2004). In both Chad and Darfur, there is a disproportionate absence
of fighting-age men (eighteen to twenty-nine years of age), which increases
the average age of respondents (US Department of State 2004). There are no
indications the Chadian refugees differ in significant ways from internally
displaced Darfurians in the bordering areas.15
13. An umda is a community leader in Darfuri culture.
14. A Kish grid lists individuals within a sampling unit (e.g., family) to equalize chances
of selection.
15. We can note several possible limitations of the data. First, the interviewers did not
speak the languages of the Darfuri refugees, so interpreters were required. However, the inter-
preters contributed to the study in an important way: they greeted and introduced interviewers
to the refugees, using knowledge of local customs and rules of etiquette to establish trust. The
investigators expressed high satisfaction with the interpreters’ work.
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The ADS data uniquely and extensively documented victimization
during the attacks on black African settlements in Darfur. We know of only
one other systematic quantitative study of precamp violence in Darfur, and
none that includes sexual violence (Deportere et al. 2004). As part of the
ADS survey, interviewers asked refugees, (1) when, how, and why they had
left Darfur, and (2) if, when, how, and by whom they, their families, or their
fellow villagers had been harmed since the beginning of the conflict approxi-
mately eighteen months earlier (US Department of State 2004). The survey’s
structure mixed the closed-ended format of health and crime victimization
surveys with the semistructured format of legal witness statements. We cross-
checked and supplemented the ADS data by rereading and recoding the
extensive narratives recorded in the interviews.
The ADS refugee sample, as introduced previously and as documented
in Table 1, provides a descriptive picture of the results of attacks on farms and
villages in Darfur. About 40 percent of the ADS respondents are male and
are, on average, thirty-seven years old (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008,
93). Female refugees probably outnumber males in Darfur because males are
more likely to be killed, while females are more likely to be raped and survive,
at least in a physical sense. Just over half of the Africans in the sample
self-identified as Zaghawa, approximately a quarter as Masaleit, and about
5 percent each as Fur and Jebal (173). The largest concentrations of the
Zaghawa fled from North Darfur, while most of the Masaleit and Fur fled from
West Darfur, with the Jebal previously concentrated in one town, Seleya, in
West Darfur (173). The identification of the groups is important in establish-
ing the protected status of the victims of the atrocities.
We read and coded each narrative to designate the attacking group as
Janjaweed, Sudanese, or combined Sudanese and Janjaweed forces. We distin-
guished GoS forces and Janjaweed militia by their clothing and equipment.
About two-thirds of the attackswere joint Sudanese and Janjaweed operations,
nearly a fifth of the attacks involved Sudanese forces acting alone (usually in
bombing attacks), and about one-tenth involved the Janjaweed alone (173).
The remaining 10 percent of cases are uncategorized and were used as a
comparison group in some of our analyses (173). The documentation of when
the attacks included Sudanese military forces is important to establishing the
responsibility of Sudanese government leadership in the mass atrocities.
Second, shared method bias may result from reporting by respondents of both predictor
variables and sexual violence outcomes. However, aggregated reports of sexual violence across
villages yielded highly reliable reporting. We also controlled for the respondents’ reports of their
own sexual victimization to minimize potential common sources of bias and heterogeneity.
Third, an indirect survey of Darfuri villagers who fled from Sudan could introduce selec-
tivity bias. Yet the Chad survey displays demographics similar to those from Sudanese camp
surveys. The refugee survey allows for questions about sexual victimization unasked in the
camps. An adjustment for months since the respondents’ flight to Chad is a partial control for
selectivity.
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During the second two-week period of the ADS interviews, a question
was added asking if there were rebels actually staying in the respondent’s town
or village (US Department of State 2004). Less than 2 percent of the respon-
dents in the sample reported a rebel presence (US Department of State 2004).
Reports of rebels were disproportionately located in several northern settle-
ments, such as Karnoi, near Tine, and Girgira, where the rebel presence was
still reported to be low, but ranging from 6 to 13 percent (US Department
of State 2004). The documentation of rebel involvement in the settlements
that were attacked is important to refuting the Sudanese government’s
defense that it was acting in proportionate self-defense against an organized
insurgency (de Waal 2004).16
16. For a discussion of the idea that the attacks in Darfur, analyzed in this research, were
coordinated in response to an organized insurgency, see de Waal (2004).
TABLE 1.
Individual- and Settlement-Level Profiles, Atrocities Documentation
Survey, Darfur Refugees, July–August 2004
Individual-Level Characteristics Mean SD
Respondent Attributes
Mean age 37.100 years 14.634
Male .400 .491
African Group Membership
Zaghawa .527 .550
Fur .055 .288
Masaleit .275 .447
Others (Reference Group) .143 .330
Attacking Groups
GoS or Janjaweed (Reference Group) .328 .345
GoS and Janjaweed Militia .672 .470
Ethnic Protection
Reported Arab Villages Spared .063 .244
Racial Targeting
Heard Racial Epithets .343 .475
Reported Sexual Victimization
Reported Own Victimization .040 .205
Reported Victimization of Others 1.184 2.539
Village-Level Characteristics
Racial Intention
Mean Racial Epithets Heard .312 .144
Abbreviations: GoS, Government of Sudan Forces.
Note: N = 932 individuals (level-1) in twenty-two village clusters (level-2).
Data are expressed as percentage of respondents unless otherwise indicated.
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There were two waves of attacks in Darfur, and these predictably corre-
sponded with the peak periods involving violent and health-related death and
displacement. About a quarter of the sample fled during the first three months
of the first wave of attacks, about half fled during the four months of the second
wave of attacks, and the remaining quarter fled during the other thirteen
months (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008, 173). The second wave of
attacks was obviously the most costly in terms of the physical destruction of
the group conditions of social life for black Africans in Darfur. It was during
the second wave of attacks, in December 2003, that President al-Bashir vowed
to “annihilate Darfur rebels” (see Agence France-Presse 2003; Hagan and
Rymond-Richmond 2009, 139–40). Figure 2 shows monthly death counts
from January 2003 to August 2004, which encompasses the two waves of
attacks as well as the months before and after. The two sources of death counts
are the ADS interviews and a separate survey based on news and nongovern-
mental organization reports of deaths in attacks on 101 villages (Petersen
and Tullin 2005). The parallel patterns in the two studies provide a source
of convergent validation for the data collection in both research efforts.
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There are more than a dozen frequently cited estimates of the death toll
in Darfur (Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010). Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo
estimated that 35,000 African villagers were killed outright in Darfur and
that 100,000 died overall (Situation in Darfur 2008, 7). The higher estimate
includes deaths from disease and malnutrition associated with forced dis-
placement following from the attacks. Science and the Lancet published
peer-reviewed lower- to upper-bound confidence interval estimates of Darfur
mortality from the conflict in the range of 170,000 to 255,000 and 178,000 to
461,520, respectively.17 Although President al-Bashir and the Sudanese gov-
ernment estimate that 9,000 have died in Darfur, there is a reasonable basis to
believe that the total is over 100,000. And there is a growing convergence
based on the research literature outlined here on estimates of approximately
300,000 deaths (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2009, 102).
The Reporting of Racial Epithets
The ADS interviews are highly detailed in recording the shouting of
racial epithets, our measure of racially targeted intent, during the attacks
(US Department of State 2004). The epithets are important, in part,
because they provide evidence of explicit targeting that focused the attacks
in a way that went beyond the multiple ethnic tribal identities indigenous to
Darfur (i.e., the Zaghawa, Fur, and Masaleit). The effect of these epithets
was to identify an explicit binary racial division. As we see next, although
both ethnic and racial groups are protected under the Genocide Conven-
tions, ethnic attributions are more easily dismissed as subjectively and inter-
nally adopted by the groups themselves (UN International Commission of
Inquiry 2005).
The UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur approached the
distinction between subjective and objective identity as an important issue of
atrocity law. This is an example of how David Scheffer (2006, 229) argues
that the exclusively legal framing of such issues can inhibit parties from acting
on their responsibility to investigate and protect against attacks on victimized
groups. The Commission of Inquiry concluded that victims of violence in
Darfur were not objectively distinct from their attackers and therefore were
not recognizable as protected ethnic or racial groups under the Genocide
Convention:
The various tribes that have been the objects of attacks and killings
(chiefly the Fur, Massaleit [sic] and Zaghawa tribes) do not appear to
17. Compare Hagan and Palloni (2006, 1578–79), estimating deaths in the range of
170,000 to 255,000, with Degomme and Guha-Sapir (2010, 298), estimating deaths in the
range of 178,000 to 461,520.
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make up ethnic groups distinct from the ethnic group to which persons
or militias that attack them belong. They speak the same language
(Arabic) and embrace the same religion (Muslim). In addition, also due
to the measure of intermarriage, they can hardly be distinguished in their
outward physical appearance from the members of tribes that allegedly
attacked them. (UN International Commission of Inquiry 2005, para.
129)
The commission failed to acknowledge that racial distinctions are often
socially constructed and forcefully imposed with little regard to actual physi-
cal differences. Racial epithets are important for both criminological and
legal analysis because they capture the motivation and intent of attackers.
The frequently quoted Akayesu decision in Rwanda and the Jelisic´ decision in
Bosnia both emphasize the importance of spoken language in documenting
genocide (Prosecutor v. Akayesu 1998; Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic´ 1999). Social
science evidence regarding the influence of racial epithets is shown later in
this article to have an important bearing on violence and genocidal intent
in Darfur.
We examined the narrative accounts of the attacks on a case-by-case
basis to find reports of victims and refugees hearing racial epithets. We
recorded the content of the epithets, detailing as accurately as possible the
wording of the epithets. Each surveyed individual was assigned a code indi-
cating whether or not he or she heard racial epithets. We argue that the racial
epithets combine elements of motivation and intent and that they were raised
to compelling collective levels in the village settings where they were most
frequently heard.
Refugees often reported hearing their attackers shouting racial slurs
such as “This is the last day for blacks,” “We will destroy the black-skinned
people,” “Kill all the slaves,” “Kill all the blacks,” “You are black, you deserve
to be tortured like this,” and “We will kill any slaves we find and cut off their
heads” (US Department of State 2004). The mixture of ethnic and racial
markers in the expressed motivations for the sexual violence during the
attacks is illustrated in the additional ADS reports of the speech used during
the attacks. The surveys noted the following statements indicating violent
action based on ethnic and racial motivations:
• “Masalit [sic]—you are dirty; you deserve to be raped. You are black—you
deserve to be tortured like this.”
• Janjaweed said to women they raped after cutting their arms to brand them,
“You are now Arab wives. There are no men here.”
• In August, some women returned and were raped by Arabs, who said to
them, “You will have Arab babies.”
• Arabs said that they would kill as many Masaleit as they could and that the
rest would never live there again. They also said, “We will take your women
and make them ours. We will change the race.”
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• Ten men raped a black African woman and said, “You are black people’s
wives and you bear black children but now you have to bear white people’s
children” (US Department of State 2004).
These words and phrases shouted by the perpetrators of sexual violence
provide insight regarding the attackers’ motivation and intentions during
the raids on Darfuri villagers.
We used village-level proportions of respondents hearing racial epithets
to measure the aggregation and concentration of racial targeting. These
scores ranged from 0 to 50.2 percent, indicating wide variation across villages.
We shorten the reference to “collective racial intent” in the following pages,
but it is noteworthy that both motivation and intent are involved in the
reported racial epithets. We also include as a further measure of the “us-
versus-them” dynamic of ethnic cleansing the respondents’ reports of nearby
Arab villages being spared from attacks.
Figure 3 presents a bar graph based on a three-month moving average of
refugees from Darfur surveyed in the ADS who reported hearing racial epi-
thets during attacks. The dating indicates when, according to the refugees,
they departed from their farms and villages in Darfur. The upward ascent
in respondents’ reports of hearing racial epithets begins in June 2003,
the month when Musa Hilal returned to Darfur after a period of detention
elsewhere (Flint and de Waal 2005, 98).18
This is also the time period during which the Office of the Prosecutor
indicates Deputy Minister Harun visited Darfur numerous times to lead a
major recruitment drive with local leaders such as Hilal (Situation in Darfur
2007, paras. 47, 122). Harun spoke at meetings across Darfur, repeating the
message that he held the power “to kill or forgive whoever [sic]” he wanted
and that he possessed the authority “to kill three-quarters of Darfur in order
to allow one quarter to live” (para. 30). The Office of the Prosecutor reports
the testimony of a witness about a specific July 2003 speech in Al Geneina:
“On that day, Harun’s speech was preceded by that of the notorious Militia/
Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal. Hilal’s speech was characterized by the witness
who heard it as ‘very racist.’ Hilal was enthusiastic about unifying to fight the
enemy and characterized the conflict as ‘holy war’” (para. 30).
Enumerating Sexual Violence and Mass Atrocities
The final pieces of our descriptive portrait from the ADS sample consist
of the reports of mass atrocities. The classical understanding of genocide
18. Flint and de Waal (2005) explain that in June 2003, Hilal flew back to Darfur and
organized the Janjaweed with government support, reportedly as a result of the intervention of
Vice President Ali Osman Taha.
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emphasizes the intentional taking of lives that characterizes the destruction
of a group.19 A more contemporary approach to genocide also focuses on the
deliberate infliction of conditions of life on a group calculated to bring about
its destruction.
Both the taking of lives and the conditions of life are crucial components
of the Genocide Convention’s definition of what constitutes genocide.
According to Article II of the Genocide Convention, genocide consists of
19. The classical focus in defining genocide on loss of life likely derives from the massive
mortality during the Holocaust and from the customary importance attached to human life in
common law.
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any of the following five acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group:
1. killing members of the group;
2. causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
3. deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
4. imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; or
5. forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948)
Any one of the five specified elements can legally constitute genocide. The
third act, with its reference to “group conditions of life,” is perhaps the most
all-encompassing element and the most meaningful for understanding how
genocidal violence denies sustainable life to entire villages, communities,
or populations. There is little doubt that sexual violence can undermine
conditions of group life and lead to the destruction of that group.
Our measurement approach involved using a report section from
each survey that recorded incidents of victimization. Respondents reported
attacks on themselves, their families, and their settlements, which involved
bombing, killing, rape, abduction, assault, property destruction, and theft.
Each respondent therefore reported for him- or herself together with his or
her settlement. Our most specific interest was in systematic counts of the
number of sexual attacks reported by the respondents. However, for compara-
tive purposes, we also created a total victimization severity score, which we
describe first based on the common law seriousness of the incidents reported
for attacks on the settlements. High Commissioner Pillay (2009a; also in this
symposium) noted the importance of measuring the link between the sexual
violence and other mass atrocities when she observed: “The case law of the
tribunals has given us direction as to how to conduct investigations. We know
that commanders have been found responsible for the ‘incidental murders
and rapes’ that were deemed to be the ‘natural and foreseeable consequences
of an ethnic cleansing campaign’.”
We aggregated reports of specific incidents experienced or witnessed by
each respondent in the settlement. To create the total victimization score,
we assigned the following values to the incidents: 5 to reported killings,
4 to sexual attacks, 3 to assaults, 2 to property destruction or theft, and 1 to
displacement.
To illustrate the coding of the incidents in the severity scale, consider
the example of a thirty-five-year-old Masaleit woman with a total severity
score of 52. The attack reported by this woman occurred in a village near
Masteri. Sudanese government troops and Arab Janjaweed militia attacked
her village on September 1, 2003. She reported twenty incidents during the
attack that occurred that day. Her report pertains to herself, her family, and
others in the village. During the attack, she was beaten (severity score of 3)
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and raped (4). Her father was severely beaten (3) while trying to protect her,
and he was subsequently abducted (4). Some women from her village were
abducted (4) and held for two hours. They were beaten (3) and raped (4)
before being released. Another group of women ranging in age from sixteen
to twenty were raped (4), and she personally witnessed one of the rapes and
heard about the rapes from other victims (4). Additional villagers, including
her brother, were beaten (3), shot (3), and stabbed (3). She witnessed dead
bodies (5), all male, some of which had their throats cut, and others that
had been shot in the head. Her village was completely destroyed (2) except
for three huts that were on the far edge of the village. Theft occurred (2),
including that of livestock, food, and water pots. She reported that there was
no rebel activity in or around her village. The only defense the villagers had
was a few spears, which were no match for the attackers’ guns, knives, pickup
trucks with mounted guns, and aircraft. She entered Chad in February 2004,
becoming one of the two to three million Darfurians displaced (1) by the mass
atrocities.
We defined sexual victimization as including rape, sexual assault, acts of
sexual molestation such as insertion of foreign objects into the genital opening
or anus, and sexual slavery. Four percent of the full sample and 7 percent
of women refugees reported having been victimized.20 Nearly a third of the
Darfuri refugees (29.1 percent) indicated that other villagers were sexually
victimized during attacks. Others’ sexual victimization is coded from one to
ten other persons victimized, with a mean of 1.18. As noted previously, the
sexual victimization of others is our ultimate outcome variable, while we used
self-reports of sexual victimization of the respondent as a control variable
for unmeasured heterogeneity or reporting bias. Map 1 indicates that sexual
violence was most common in West Darfuri villages, where Fur and Masaleit
tribal groups were concentrated. This map further reveals that the villages
ranking highest in reports of sexual violence were also usually the same villages
ranking highest in total victimization, which included killings as well as other
forms of physical and sexual violence. This overlapping of sexual and other
forms of violence is consistent with the finding in the ICTR Akayesu case in
Rwanda. The Akayesu case found that rape is “an integral part of the process
of destruction” (Prosecutor v. Akayesu 1998). The ICTY Kunarac, Kovac &
Vukovic case (2001) also recognized rape as part of crimes against humanity.
IV. APPLYING AN APPROPRIATE ANALYTIC METHOD
The HLM methodology designed for multilevel clustered samples
(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002) was then used to analyze the data. HLM allows
20. The latter figure approximates reporting of sexual assaults in Sierra Leone (see
Amowitz et al. 2002, 518).
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analysis within and between villages. We analyzed the combined roles
of GoS forces with Janjaweed militias in the racial targeting of sexual
violence—as well as in the sparing of Arab villages—in an “us-versus-them”
dynamic of targeted violence and ethnic cleansing.
First we used a logistic regression to model binary reports of whether
individuals heard racial epithets during the attacks. Then we estimated joined
individual- and village-level Poisson regression equations of the sexual vic-
timization of others (adjusted for dispersion, months of exposure before flight,
and the respondent’s own sexual victimization).21 The dependent variable,
sexual victimization, is the count of the number of other persons reported by
each individual in the village to have been sexually attacked, as described
here. HLM allows simultaneous analysis of outcomes within and between
villages. Thus, our within-village Poisson model first regresses the individual-
level reports of sexual victimization by the 932 respondents on their indi-
vidual reports of racial epithets and other independent variables defined in
the following pages. Our between-village Poisson model then regresses the
average sexual victimization scores for the twenty-two villages—after the
individual-level variables are taken into account—on the proportion of
the respondents who report they heard racial epithets in each village. The
averaging of victimization scores within villages allows us to avoid over-
counting overlapping reports.22
Poisson models assume independence of the modeled events. Reports of
the sexual victimization of others could be viewed as problematic, as hearsay
evidence, and as well be dependent on the respondents’ own sexual victim-
ization. To minimize such dependence and the violation of this assumption,
we include in our Poisson model of the sexual victimization of others an
independent variable that is the individual’s own report of being sexually
victimized.
We learn from this joint analysis not only about individual sources
of reported sexual victimization in Darfur, but also about the influence
of aggregate differences in the distribution of racial epithets between
villages on sexual victimization, with individual-level variables controlled.
We ultimately show in Map 1 how these joint GoS and Janjaweed
21. Poisson regression is a kind of regression analysis that is most often used to analyze
data that takes the form of counts, in this case counts of rape and sexual assault.
22. The equations for the hierarchical Poisson model are as follows:
ln ij oj k kj kji jiλ β β ε= + +Σ Χ
β pi pi δoj oo o1 j j= + +Υ
where lij is the rate of sexual victimization of others reported by individual i in settlement j,
bkj’s are regression coefficients for variables k in settlement j, Xkji is individual-level covariates,
Yj represents the proportion of individuals in settlement j who heard racial epithets, poo is a
constant term for the entire sample, po1 is the effect associated with the proportion hearing
racial epithets, and eji and dj are Poisson and normally distributed errors.
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attacks are associated with aggregated and concentrated racial intent
at the village level in the prediction of sexual victimization in Darfur.
We also include on this map a parallel indication of total victimization
scores.
The models we estimate thus consider the following: (1) whether
ethnic group members of the Fur, Masaleit, and Zaghawa tribes more
often report hearing racial epithets during attacks, our indicator of intent
to victimize a protected group; (2) whether the joining of government
and nongovernment forces in attacks, and the sparing of nearby Arab
villages, further predicts reports of hearing racial epithets; (3) whether
reports of hearing racial epithets are unequally distributed across villages
and whether this is an important determinant of the effects epithets
have on reported sexual violence; and (4) whether joined govern-
ment and nongovernment attacks in conjunction with higher prevalence
of racial epithets at the village level predict higher rates of sexual
victimization.
The HLM reliability score resulting from the partitioning of the variance
of others’ sexual victimization within and between villages is 0.906, indicat-
ing precision at the village level. This high score not only speaks to but
should almost completely eliminate concerns about the unreliability of the
hearsay nature of the ADS evidence of sexual victimization. The surveys
analyzed here are therefore strong elements of the new type of social science
evidence called for by Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo and High Commissioner
Pillay.
Mapping the Racial Targeting
We can summarize important aspects of our analysis on two maps. We
begin with the distribution of the racial epithets heard during attacks by
the ADS respondents. First, we consider how the reporting of these epithets
varies across the settlements—that is, we answer the question, “where were
these epithets heard most often?” Second, we consider how racial epithets
are distributed in terms of the characteristics of the individuals who heard
them—that is, we answer the question, “who heard these epithets most
often?”
Map 1 portrays the variation in reported racial epithets across the settle-
ments. It indicates variation in the proportion of respondents reporting
epithets with circles of increasing sizes (calibrated in quartiles) in the settle-
ments. About half of the respondents in the top quartile heard racial epithets
during the attacks. Thus, 45 percent of the respondents heard racial epithets
in Kabkabiya, where early attacks are reported to have included Musa Hilal,
and 43 to 50 percent of respondents heard these epithets in settlements
in southwestern Darfur—in Al Geneina, Masteri, Habilah, Garsila, Foro
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Burunga, and Bendesi—the sites of attacks reported in the media and in the
ADS data to have been led by three other Janjaweed militia leaders. These
sites in southwestern Darfur are in the more fertile and densely settled areas
of Darfur.
MAP 1.
Total Victimization and Sexual Victimization, with Percentage of Persons
Hearing Racial Epithets
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Map 2 outlines the locations where news media and human rights groups
reported attacks that were led by four militia leaders—Musa Hilal, Hamid
Dawai, Ali Kushayb, and Abdullah Shineibat. We designate the approximate
areas of these leaders’ operations on Map 2. These are also the areas with a
high number of reports of racial epithets and attacks in Map 1.
MAP 2.
Janjaweed Militia Leaders’ Areas of Operation
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Modeling the Racial Epithets
Table 2 presents a logistic regression model of respondents hearing racial
epithets during attacks. The model indicates men were more likely than
women to hear epithets. Nearly three-quarters (72.8 percent) of the women
refugees had no schooling, and less than 5 percent (4.5 percent) had attended
Islamic school, while just over one-third (35.6 percent) of men refugees had
no schooling, and more than a quarter (26.0 percent) had attended Islamic
school. Men were thus more likely to understand and report racial epithets
shouted in Arabic.
Themodel further indicates that the Fur,Masaleit, andZaghawawere also
more likely than others to hear the racial epithets. The Zaghawa experienced
more bombing than ground attacks, which may explain why they were some-
what less likely than the other targeted groups to report hearing racial epithets.
Much attention has been paid to the specific targeting of the Fur in Darfur. An
additional finding of the model is that respondents who reported that nearby
Arab villages were spared also were more likely to report hearing racial
epithets. The final important finding in the model is that racial epithets were
more likely to be heard during joint Sudanese government and Janjaweed
attacks, suggesting government involvement in elevating the racial epithets.
It is possible that the combined forces shouted the epithets in several
languages, thereby increasing the likelihood that racial epithets would be
understood by respondents. Yet this could account neither for an effect of
TABLE 2.
Logistic Regression Model of Racial Epithets Heard, Atrocities Documen-
tation Survey, Darfur Refugees, July–August 2004
Individual-Level Characteristics
b(se) OR 95% CI
Respondent Attributes
Age -.005 (.005) .995 (.985, 1.005)
Gender .655 (.185)*** 1.925 (1.339, 2.766)
African Group Membership
Fur .679 (.252)** 1.973 (1.206, 3.231)
Masaleit .727 (.200)*** 2.070 (1.398, 3.064)
Zaghawa .384 (.192)* 1.469 (1.008, 2.141)
Attacking Groups
GoS and Janjaweed .652 (.165)*** 1.920 (1.389, 2.653)
Ethnic Protection
Arab Villages Spared 1.123 (.231)*** 3.074 (1.957, 4.830)
Intercept -1.737 (.288) .176 (.097, .320)
Note: N = 932 individuals in twenty-two settlement clusters.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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combined forces on sexual victimization nor for the persistence of an effect
of racial epithets on sexual victimization after statistically controlling for
combined attacks.
Modeling the Sexual Victimization
To the extent that ethnic cleansing and genocide victimization en-
compass a group “in whole”—as, for example, a “scorched earth” policy would
imply—there might be little within- or between-settlement variation in
number of deaths or severity of victimization of the kind whose quantitative
measurement we have just described; all would be victimized. On the other
hand, to the extent that this group victimization is “in part,” there should be
variance in both within- and between-settlement outcomes. For the crimi-
nological and legal reasons we have indicated, we were particularly interested
in determining the role that racial intent played in explaining variation in
Sudanese state-organized victimization, along with the Janjaweed militias,
of the black African groups and settlements.
Our interest was thus in the settlements as much as in the individuals
who are the victims of the Darfur conflict as represented in the ADS sample.
The hypothetical process examined in our analysis is shown in Figure 4. We
analyzed the combined roles of GoS forces with Janjaweed militias in racially
targeted mass atrocities, as well as in the selective protection of nearby Arab
villagers. Selective protection as well as predation can be an instrumental way
Combined GoS and 
Janjaweed Attacks 
Ethnic Protection 
Settlement-Level Racial Intent 
Individual-Level Racial 
Intent 
Mass Atrocities in 
Darfur 
FIGURE 4.
Combined Roles of GoS and Janjaweed with Ethnic Protection in Racially
Targeted Ethnic Cleansing and Mass Atrocities in Darfur
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of separating “us” from “them” in an organizational dynamic of violence and
ethnic cleansing resulting in mass atrocities.
Table 3 presents Poisson models of sexual violence, with robust
standard errors and successively adjusted for dispersion and for months of
exposure before respondents’ flight, as well as controlling for respondents’
own reported sexual victimization. The results are strikingly consistent
across the columns. A significant age effect indicates that younger respon-
dents reported more sexual victimization. More striking is the direct and
significant role of the combined government and Janjaweed forces in
explaining sexual victimization. More striking still is the simultaneously
significant role of racial intention when measured as a proportion of respon-
dents who heard racial epithets at the village level. This effect is the net of
all other variables in the table, including racial epithets measured at the
individual level, as well as respondents’ own reported sexual victimization.
As expected, the latter self-reports have a highly significant effect on the
reported sexual victimization of others. The effects of combined GoS and
Janjaweed attacks and village-level racial intention remain statistically
significant, withstanding controls for bias and unmeasured heterogeneity
in reports of sexual victimization.
The fact that ethnic group membership exercises statistically significant
effects on the hearing of racial epithets (Table 2), and that these racial
epithets measured at the village level exercise statistically significant effects
on sexual victimization (Table 3), is consistent with the causal inference that
ethnic group membership and racial intentions directly and indirectly lead to
sexual victimization (see Baron and Kenny 1986, 1180-81). This sequence of
findings is an important part of the reasonable grounds evidence indicating
that the protected group statuses of ethnicity and race are associated with
sexual violence in ways that violate the Genocide Convention. A more
detailed discussion of checks on the further sources of causal dependency in
the Poisson models presented in Table 3 is provided in the Appendix.
The results from the Poisson model of sexual victimization are summa-
rized graphically in Figure 5. This figure shows the predicted number of other
persons sexually victimized in the villages, which results from the proportion
of respondents who reported hearing racial epithets. The figure also shows
that the attacking forces were a combination of GoS and Janjaweed forces.23
Thus, the top line in this figure indicates that an average of more than one
person and as many as two were reported sexually victimized when half or
more of the respondents reported hearing racial epithets during attacks by
combined GoS and Janjaweed forces. Sexual victimizations were reported
less often when the attacks were described as being perpetuated by separate
GoS or Janjaweed forces and occurring in the absence of racial epithets. The
23. Other variables in the Poisson model are set at their mean values.
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combined weight of the described analyses paints a compelling picture of
GoS and Janjaweed joint participation in sexual violence against black Afri-
cans. As the statistically controlled analysis of the use of racial epithets
indicates, this jointly perpetuated violence appears to have been intended
to destroy the targeted group’s way of life.
V. CONCLUSIONS
High Commissioner Pillay (2009a; also in this symposium) reminded
the colloquium that the prosecution of grave sexual attacks in international
criminal law is not merely an option, but rather it is a responsibility:
Let me reiterate and summarize the key elements of the cases from the
tribunals. To begin with, international justice has now deemed rape as a
natural and foreseeable consequence of a lack of discipline in cases
involving other violations of international humanitarian law. Further, it
has established command responsibility and upheld the duty of enquiry
to reflect the obligation of persons in a position of responsibility and
authority to prevent violations from occurring, and to punish perpetra-
tors when such crimes are committed. In addition, it considered that
culpability could involve all those engaged in sexual violence crimes,
directly or indirectly.
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FIGURE 5.
Additive Effects of Combined GoS and Janjaweed Attacks in Racially
Targeted Sexual Victimization in Darfur
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Failure to prosecute gender and sexual violence that occurs in conflict zones
is an evasion of the responsibility to protect those victimized and is a legally
unacceptable form of denial. Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo (2009) put the
matter squarely when he said, “It is normal that President Al Bashir denies
the crime, but the question is: why is the international community joining
in the denial?”
In July 2008, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor, led by Prosecutor
Moreno-Ocampo, applied to the Judicial Chambers of the ICC for charges
including rape and genocide against Sudan’s president.24 In March 2009, the
ICC judges issued a warrant for the arrest of President al-Bashir on charges of
crimes against humanity, extermination, and rape—but not genocide.25 This
last decision was appealed.26 The ICC judges’ decision not to charge genocide
ignored the importance of social science evidence demonstrating the racial
targeting of protected groups in Darfur for acts of sexual violence and con-
stituted a legal denial of a key part of the racially based mens rea that led to
rape and sexual violence in Darfur. This failure of the international commu-
nity to provide protection to racially targeted groups in Darfur has been
rectified by the recent reversal of the Pretrial Chamber and the issuance of an
arrest warrant for President al-Bashir for crimes of genocide. The question
remains, however, as to what evidence will be used in an attempt to convict
al-Bashir before the ICC and in future cases of genocide.
The evidence we present indicates that Fur, Masaleit, and Zaghawa
farmers and villagers in Darfur heard racial epithets with increasing frequency
during attacks in the summer of 2003. This was the period when the Sudanese
central government reinstalled militia leader Musa Hilal in Darfur and when
Deputy Minister Ahmad Harun held public meetings in Darfur with Hilal.
The Fur, Masaleit, and Zaghawa villagers heard racially motivated shouts and
slurs more often when GoS forces joined with Janjaweed groups in attacks on
their farms and settlements. These villagers also experienced violent victim-
ization more often when they heard these epithets. This victimization
included mass atrocities in general and sexual attacks in particular. The
unfolding pattern of events was both undeniable and foreseeable upward
through the chain of command, reaching to the highest level of Sudan’s
government and ending at President al-Bashir. It was his responsibility to
protect the citizens of Darfur from these attacks. Because he failed to do so,
and indeed had “specific intent” to destroy these citizens, it is now the
responsibility of the ICC to prosecute President al-Bashir for crimes against
24. See Situation in Darfur (2008, 1): Al Bashir “bears criminal responsibility for the
crime of genocide.”
25. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir (2009a, para. 206), finding insufficient evidence of geno-
cidal intent. But see Prosecutor v. Al Bashir (para. 105): “I am satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds . . . to believe that Omar Al Bashir has committed the crime of genocide.”
26. See Situation in Darfur (2009); see also Prosecutor v. Al Bashir (2010), granting
prosecutor’s appeal and remanding to the trial court.
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humanity, extermination, rape, and genocide. The data and analyses
described in this article aid in doing so.
APPENDIX: THE ISSUE OF DEPENDENCY IN MODELING
THE REPORTED SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF OTHERS
IN DARFUR
The Poisson model assumes that reported events of sexual violence
occur independently. Yet there may be sources of dependence. There are two
possibilities: (1) a single source is responsible for the reports of each person
but the sources are independent (that is, they are not the same), or (2) a
single source is responsible for the reports of each person and the source is
correlated across persons.
If (1) is the case, then the number of acts of violence reported by each
individual within a fixed time period could be considered Poisson if the
events occur independently of each other. But if (2) is the case and there is
a single source, say, a single battle or attack or clustered sampling of respon-
dents in villages, then the number of violent events reported may not follow
a Poisson. Controls for the respondent’s own victimization, which we include
in our model, help to purge for dependency but do not completely explain it
away. Fortunately, the hierarchical linear model (HLM) we have used further
addresses the second set of possibilities.
HLM allows the calculation of robust standard errors that are adjusted
for the increased within-group homogeneity resulting from sampling of clus-
tered respondents. HLM further allows for the adjustment of coefficients and
standard errors for increased heterogeneity resulting from correlated sources
of over-dispersion. For example, the correlated targeting of attacks on
selected villages can result in increased heterogeneity or variance in reported
events across villages. HLM allows a relaxation of the independence assump-
tion by not imposing distributional assumptions on the extra-Poisson vari-
ance parameter. The result is a negative binomial model yielding estimates
that can better capture the underlying process: the adjusted coefficients are
efficient and the standard errors are unbiased.
Table 3 presents coefficients and standard errors in four different models,
all of which include adjustments for length of the respondent’s exposure to risk
before his or her flight. However, Model 1 does not include reports of the
respondent being sexually victimized in estimating the reported sexual victim-
izations of others. Five variables significantly predict sexual victimization of
others in this model—being younger, being Fur, combined attack by GoS
forces and Janjaweedmilitia, individual-level reports of hearing racial epithets,
and mean village-level reports of hearing racial epithets.
Model 2 adds the control for self-reports of the respondent’s own sexual
victimization, which is statistically significant and strong. The biggest change
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in Model 2 is that gender is now statistically significant. This makes sense,
because in Darfur women more often than men report being raped, while men
more often report others being raped. The latter effect is suppressed in Model
1 and revealed in Model 2 by the inclusion of the measure of the respondent’s
own sexual victimization. In addition, the five variables previously found
statistically significant remain so. The effect of being Fur declines by about
one-third in strength, while the effect of combined GoS and Janjaweed
attacks increases by more than 20 percent.
The final two models, Models 3 and 4, introduce two further adjust-
ments: robust standard errors (Model 3) and adjustment for over-dispersion
(Model 4). These models yield similar results. The effects of gender, being Fur,
and individual-level racial epithets now are reduced below significance, while
the following four variables retain their strength and statistical significance:
being younger, combined attack by GoS forces and Janjaweed militia, the
respondent’s own sexual victimization, and village-level mean of respondents
hearing racial epithets. The village-level effect of hearing racial epithets is
reduced by about one-quarter in size, but the standard error of this coefficient
is similarly reduced, so the statistical significance of this effect remains stable.
The essential point is this: across the four models, the key variables in our
analysis—combined attacks and village-level racial epithets—remain stable in
their significant effects on the reported sexual victimization of others.
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